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NOTES
DOES TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
PROHIBIT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION — AN ANALYSIS
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' prohibits discrimination
based on sex in any federally funded educational program. Section 901 of title
IX provides in pertinent part that: "No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance . . . "2
 In enacting title IX, Congress sought
to accomplish two related objectives: it wanted to avoid the use of federal funds
to support discriminatory practices, and it wanted to provide individuals with
effective protection against those practices.' To accomplish these ends, Con-
gress patterned title IX after title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin in federal-
ly funded programs or activities.' Congress intended title IX to do for women
students what title VI had done for minorities. In fact, the language in section
901 of title IX is almost identical to that of section 601 of title VI. 5 The major
difference between the two statutes is that title VI contains a provision, section
604, which explicitly excludes employment from title VI's coverage by pro-
viding that, "[n]othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to
authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with
respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or
labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial
assistance is to provide employment."' Title IX, however, lacks a provision
that explicitly excludes employment from its coverage.
When the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) pro-
mulgated regulations to give effect to title IX,' it included employment prac-
20 U.S.C. 5$ 1681-1686 (1976).
20 U.S.C. $ 1681(a) (1976).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). In support of this
declaration, the Court cited a comment made by title IX's Senate sponsor, Senator Bayh, while
the bill was pending, "[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is
needed if we are to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training
for later careers." Id. at 704 n.36 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972)).
4
 See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 5803, 5807 (1972).
5
 42 U.S.C. $$ 2000d-2000d-6 (1976).
6
 Section 601 of title VI provides: 'No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. $ 2000d (1976).
42 U.S.C. $ 2000d-3 (1976).
This authority was granted by 20 U.S.C. 	 1682 (1976). Jurisdiction over educa-
tional matters was transferred from HEW to the new Department of Education on May 4, 1980.
Pub. L. No. 96-88, 301, 93 Stat. 677 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 5 3441 (Supp. III 1979)). Due to
this transfer of functions, the HEW regulations effectuating title IX, 45 C.F.R. $5 86.1-86.71
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tices of educational institutions within the reach of the Act's prohibitions. 9 The
validity of these employment-related regulations has been challenged in several
courts as exceeding the authority granted to HEW by title IX.'° The issue con-
sidered by these courts is whether title IX includes a prohibition against sex
discrimination in the employment practices of educational institutions or
whether it only prohibits discrimination against students based on sex. If title
IX does not encompass employment discrimination, then HEW has exceeded
its authority by promulgating the title IX employment regulations and they are
invalid.
The controversy over whether title IX protects the employees of educa-
tional institutions as well as the students has arisen for several reasons. First,
the statutory language of section 901 of title IX is ambiguous. Second, unlike
title VI, the statute fails to prohibit employment from its coverage in explicit
terms. Finally, the legislative history contains remarks that are susceptible to
more than one interpretation. The confusion created by these factors is illus-
trated by the three different interpretations of the scope of title IX's coverage
that have been espoused by courts that have addressed this issue: (1) title IX
does not include employment," (2) title IX covers all employment practices of
schools receiving federal money," and (3) title IX regulates employment prac-
tices only in specific, federally funded programs.t 3
The view held by a majority of the courts of appeals which have decided
this issue is that title IX does not cover employment practices and that HEW
has exceeded its authority under title IX by promulgating regulations govern-
(1979), have been reissued in identical form in 34 C.F.R. SS 106.1-106.71 (1980). 45 Fed. Reg.
30802 (May 9, 1980). In order to be consistent with the previously decided cases, this note will
continue to refer to HEW and to the original regulations.
4 45 C.F.R. SS 86.51-86.61 (1979). Although these regulations cover a wide range of
employment practices, such as compensation, job classification and fringe benefits, the major
thrust of the regulations is contained in 45 C.F.R. 86.51(a)(1) (1979) which provides:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, or be sub-
jected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, or selec-
tion therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any education program or ac-
tivity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial
assistance.
Id.
1 ° See Dougherty County School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980); North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 621 F.2d'773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom, North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992
(9th Cir. 1980) cert. granted sub nom. Department of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 101 S.Ct. 563 (1980)
(No. 80-493); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979),
art. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
" Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. granted sub nom. Department
of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 101 S.Ct. 563 (1980) (No. 80-493); Romeo Community Schools v.
HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); junior College Dist. of St.
Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
15 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted
sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
' 3 Dougherty County School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ing the employment practices of educational institutions." The leading case
adhering to this view is Islesboro School Committee u. Califano. 15
 In that case,
several school districts in Maine were accused of discrimination on the basis of
sex in their maternity leave policies because they treated maternity differently
from other temporary disabilities." These policies were alleged to violate title
IX and an HEW regulation.' 7 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
held that title IX is limited to prohibiting sex discrimination against students
and other direct beneficiaries of federal educational assistance funds and does
not extend to the employment practices of educational institutions receiving
such funds." Accordingly, the court held that HEW had no power to pro-
mulgate the regulations concerning employment. 19
In contrast to the First Circuit's determination that employment is not
covered under title IX, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in North Haven
Board of Education v. Hufstedler held that title IX does authorize the regulation of
employment practices by HEW." In that case, it was alleged that the North
Haven Board of Education had violated title IX and the HEW regulations by
refusing to rehire a tenured teacher after a one year maternity leave. 2 ' In ex-
amining the scope of title IX and the validity of the regulations, the court held
that title IX gave HEW the authority to promulgate its employment
discrimination regulations."
The third interpretation of the scope of title IX was recently espoused in
Dougherty County School System v. Harris by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which held that HEW's regulations must be program-specific." HEW found
that the Dougherty County School System had violated HEW regulations by
paying a salary supplement to industrial arts teachers, but not to home
economics teachers. 24 The Fifth Circuit held that the regulations were invalid
because they were not limited in effect to the specific programs that receive
federal financial assistance. 25 Thus, under this view employment is covered by
title IX, but that coverage is limited to the specific programs that receive
federal funds.
" See cases cited at note 11 supra.
" 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
" Id. at 426.
' 7 Id. The HEW regulation allegedly violated provided:
A recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of
pregnancy, and recovery therefrom and any temporary disability resulting
therefrom as any other temporary disability for all job related purposes, including
commencement, duration and extensions of leave, payment of disability income,
accrual of seniority and any other benefit or service, and reinstatement, and under
any fringe benefit offered to employees by virtue of employment.
45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1979).
' 593 F.2d at 428.
Id. at 429.
2° 629 F.2d 773, 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
21 Id. at 775.
22 Id. at 786.
" 622 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1980).
24 Id. at 736.
25 Id. at 738.
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In sum, title IX prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education
programs. The statutory language of title IX does not explicitly include or ex-
clude employment practices. As a result, the courts are in disagreement over
whether title IX includes a prohibition against sex discrimination in the
employment practices of federally funded education programs.
This note will suggest that an examination of title IX's language, legisla-
tive history, and the policy behind title IX leads to the conclusion that title IX
does not cover the employment practices of educational programs receiving
federal financial assistance. As a result, the HEW employment regulations are
invalid. In reaching this conclusion, this note will'begin with an examination of
title IX's language. This investigation will be followed by a review of the
legislative history of title IX, and of post-passage developments, which have
been claimed to support the view that title IX covers employment. Then,
because title IX was patterned after title VI, that title will be examined. The
enforcement powers of HEW as limited by title IX will then be discussed
because the remedial measures offered by the statute suggest that its scope was
intended to be narrow. Finally, this note will turn to an examination of the
policy factors which favor the view that title IX is aimed at and limited to pro-
hibiting discrimination against students.
I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE
None of the language in title IX directly states whether or not employment
practices are covered. It may be inferred, however, that title IX covers only
students, not employees, because all of the specific exceptions to the broad pro-
hibitory language of section 901 focus exclusively on discrimination against
students. It is unlikely that title IX was enacted to cover employment without a
single caveat. Indeed, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426 and the Equal
Pay Act," which explicitly cover employment, both contain significant restric-
tions. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended to lift these restric-
tions in enacting title IX.
Title IX, by its terms, does not specifically mention employment in its
prohibition of sex discrimination. 2° The basic prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation is set forth in section 901 of title IX." This section also contains nine ex-
ceptions to its ban; none of these exceptions is employment-related. 30 Of the
nine exemptions, five were a part of the statute as it was originally passed and
are related to institutions." The remaining four exceptions were added later
26 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
27 29 U.S.C. 206(d) (1976).
28 See text and note at note 2 supra.
" 20 U.S.C.	 1681(a) (1976).
30 See 20 U.S.C.	 1681(a)(1)-1681(a)(9) (1976).
31 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 55 901(a)(1)-
901(a)(5), 86 Stat. 235, 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. SS 1681(a)(1)-1681(a)(5) (1976)).
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and are directed at student activities and organizations. 32
 Specifically, the
original five exemptions describe the types of institutions to which title IX's
prohibition applies and set time deadlines for reaching full compliance." The
first exception lists the classes of educational institutions subject to section
901's prohibition in regard to their admission practices." Thus, in regard to
admissions, title IX applies only to institutions of vocational education, profes-
sional education, graduate higher education and public institutions of under-
graduate higher education." The second exception provides that for a specified
number of years title IX shall not apply to the admission practices of an educa-
tional institution that is in the process of becoming a co-educational schoo1. 36
An exemption for institutions controlled by religious organizations where the
application of title IX would he inconsistent with its religious tenets is con-
tained in the third exemption," This is followed by a proviso for institutions
that train individuals for military service or the merchant marine." The fifth
exception provides that title IX shall not apply in regard to admissions to
public institutions of undergraduate higher education that continually from
their establishment have admitted only students of one sex."
In addition, the four later exceptions" are concerned only with removing
certain student activities and organizations from title IX's coverage. Member-
ship in social fraternities and sororities and voluntary youth service organiza-
tions that traditionally have been limited to persons of one sex, such as the Girl
Scouts and Boy Scouts, are exempt.'" Similarly excluded are the activities of
the American Legion and educational institutions with regard to Boys Nation
or State Conferences and Girls Nation or State Conferences." An educational
institution is also allowed to have father-son or mother-daughter activities as
long as both sexes have opportunities for reasonably comparable activities." In
addition, an educational institution may award financial assistance to a partici-
pant of a pageant which is limited to individuals of one sex.'"
None of these exceptions deals with or mentions employment. The in-
ference to be drawn is that Congress's focus was on the students and the insti-
32 See 20 U.S.C. 55 1681(a)(6)-1681(a)(9) (1976). Section 1681(a)(6) was added by Pub.
L. No. 93-568, 5 3(a), 88 Stat. 1855, 1862 in 1974. Sections 1681(a)(7), (a)(8) and (a)(9) were
added by the Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, tit. IV, 5 412(a), 90 Stat.
2081, 2234.
" See 20 U.S.C. SS 1681(a)(1)-1681(a)(5) (1976).
34 20 U.S.C. 4 1681(a)(1) (1976).
95 Id.
36 20 U.S.C.	 1681(a)(2) (1976).
37 20 U.S.C. 5 1681(a)(3) (1976).
38 20 U.S.C. S 1681(a)(4) (1976).
39 20 U.S.C.	 1681(a)(5) (1976).
40 20 U.S.C. 55 1681(a)(6)-1681(a)(9) (1976).
4 ' 20 U.S.C. 5 1681(a)(6) (1976).
42 20 U.S.C. 5 1681(a)(7) (1976).
4 ' 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(8) (1976).
44 20 U.S.C. 4 1681(a)(9) (1976).
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tutions, not on employees and employment practices. Further, these institu-
tion- and activity-related exceptions are evidence of the concern Congress had
for very specific, detailed matters regarding title IX's coverage and applica-
tion, and of the close attention it paid to detail when enacting legislation in the
area of sex discrimination. It is likely that Congress would have been equally
specific and detailed in employment matters, if it had intended that they be
covered. There are only two possible explanations for the absence of any
employment-related exceptions. First, it could be argued that Congress in-
tended to allow wide-open coverage of employment under title IX, while close-
ly regulating its application with respect to students and the types of institu-
tions involved. Alternatively, the absence of employment-related exceptions
could be viewed as evidence that Congress never meant employment practices
to be regulated by title IX." The latter explanation is the more likely of the two
choices because when Congress has regulated employment discrimination, it
usually has done so in more explicit terms.
An examination of both title VII, which prohibits employment discrimi-
nation because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," and the Equal
Pay Act, which prohibits discrimination on account of sex in the payment of
wages to employees by employers, 47 demonstrates the careful delineation of
employment coverage used by Congress." For example, section 3 of the Equal
Pay Act prohibits sex discrimination in the wage rate of employees doing equal
work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions." But this prohibition is explicitly
excepted when such payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit
system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or production, or a
wage differential based on any other factor other than sex. 50 Similarly, section
703(a) of title VII declares that it is an unlawful employment practice to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 51 This provision is modified by section
703(e)(1), which allows employers to employ an individual on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise. 52 Thus, title VII and the Equal Pay Act
reveal that Congress was cognizant of the complexity of the employment dis-
crimination area and illustrate Congress's careful attention to detail in deline-
45 Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (E.D. Mich. 1977),
aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
* 5 42 U.S.C. ,§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. 206(d) (1976).
4a This argument is even more significant because amendments to both title VII and
the Equal Pay Act were enacted as part of title IX. See text and notes at notes 100.05 infra.
49 29 U.S.C,	 206(d) (1976).
5° Id.
5 ' 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1976).
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976).
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ating the parameters of such legislation. Since title IX does not even contain a
reference to employment, it seems unlikely that title IX's language was in-
tended to extend to the complicated area of employment discrimination.
Providing additional support for the view that Congress did not intend
title IX's language to include a prohibition of employment discrimination is the
absence of any directive by Congress that title IX's prohibition be consistent
with title VII or the Equal Pay Act. 53
 It has been argued that the possible in-
consistency between title VII and title IX has been eliminated because HEW
included an exemption in its regulations similar to the statutory exemption in
title VII which permits sex discrimination where it is a bona fide occupational
qualification. 54 While this HEW regulation is evidence that HEW has chosen
to be consistent with title VII, the argument fails to recognize that there is
nothing in title IX that requires HEW to do so. Under title IX, HEW could
promulgate a regulation allowing it to withdraw funds for a type of sex discrim-
ination that is expressly authorized under title VII. HEW also could write
regulations requiring wage rates to be equal regardless of any seniority system,
merit system, or other wage differential allowed under the Equal Pay Act. 55
Thus, the possibility of direct conflict between the HEW regulations and the
Equal Pay Act and title VII would exist if title IX extended to employment dis-
crimination.
Possible conflicts between employment discrimination statutes have been
avoided in the past. For example, the Equal Pay Act became effective while
title VII was pending before the Senate. 56 The following day a provision was
added to title VII providing that if a wage differential were authorized by the
Equal Pay Act it would not be unlawful under title VII." This provision elimi-
nated any possible conflicts between title VII and the Equal Pay Act. This ef-
fort to achieve consistency supports the view that title IX does not prohibit
employment discrimination. Furthermore, the argument that HEW's regula-
tions are not inconsistent with title VII or the Equal Pay Act avoids the real
issue, which is whether or not HEW has the authority to regulate employment
" See 20 U.S.C. 55 1681-1686 (1976).
" See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 n.12 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No.
80-986). See 45 C.F.R. 5 86.61 (1979).
" 45 C.F.R. 5 86.54 (1979) provides:	 •
A recipient shall not make or enforce any policy or practice which, on the basis
of sex:
(a) Makes distinctions in rates of pay or other compensation;
(b) Results in the payment of wages to employees of one sex at a rate less
than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions.
This regulation could be construed in a manner that would conflict with the Equal Pay Act since
it does not explicitly allow the differentials authorized by the Equal Pay Act.
56 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was enacted on June 10, 1963 and went into effect on
June 10, 1964. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 5 4, 77 Stat. 56, 57 (1963).
57 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(h) (1976). See 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
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under title IX, not whether HEW has, by its actions, eliminated any possible
conflicts.
In light of both the congressional attention to detail in regulating employ-
ment and the possibility of conflict with other statutes governing employment
discrimination, Congress's silence should not be construed as evidence that
employment discrimination is within the scope of title IX's prohibition. On the
contrary, the silence is strong evidence that employment is not covered by title
IX." While it is true that Congress could have specifically exempted employ-
ment from title IX's coverage," it is equally true that if Congress had meant
employment to be covered, it could have specifically said so. It is imprudent to
presume coverage on the basis of silence where the statutory language is
unclear and there is so much room for conflict with other statutory schemes if
coverage is assumed. In such a situation, caution and reason dictate the con-
clusion that the absence of any mention of employment in title IX supports a
finding that employment discrimination is not within the scope of title IX.
In summary, Congress's silence should not be construed as evidence that
employment discrimination is prohibited under title IX. Title IX's nine excep-
tions reveal that its focus is on institutions and student activities, not on
employees. This interpretation is furthered by the explicit, detailed language
that is present in employment discrimination legislation, such as title VII and
the Equal Pay Act, but that is not present in title IX. Additionally, the possibil-
ity of inconsistencies between title IX and title VII and the Equal Pay Act
would exist if title IX extended to employment discrimination. Congress has
avoided conflict between the other statutes in this area. In light of these factors,
the better view is that the language of title IX does not include a prohibition
against employment discrimination. Admittedly, however, the statutory lan-
guage is ambiguous as to the class of people to which its protection extends.
Therefore, title IX's legislative history will be examined next to discern Con-
gress's intent. This examination will show that, on the whole, neither the
House of Representatives nor the Senate considered title IX to be directed
toward employment practices.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Title IX was one portion of the Education Amendments of 1972. 60 The Act
originated as separate bills in both Houses of Congress which were considered
simultaneously. 6 ' In the House, title IX was a part of the bill when it was in-
58 As the Supreme Court has noted, "Nile intention of the legislature constitutes the
law. That intention is manifested alike by what they have said and by what they have omitted to say."
Bates v. Brown, 72 U.S. 710, 718 (1866) (emphasis added).
" North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1980), art.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
6° Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972).
61 H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 9829 (1971); S. 659, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 1994 (1971).
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traduced and went through the regular committee procedure. 62 In the Senate,
title IX was not part of the bill that was considered in committee, but was
added as an amendment while the bill was on the Senate floor. 63
 Both bills were
passed" and sent to conference where agreement over differing provisions was
reached, and the resulting conference bill became law. 65
A. House History
The prohibition of sex discrimination which ultimately became title IX
was originally introduced in the House of Representatives in 1970 as a section
of an education bill. 66 This section proposed three changes in existing law.
First, it provided that title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin under any pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance, be amended by adding a
prohibition against sex discrimination.° Second, this section of the bill further
proposed that title VII's prohibition of employment discrimination be ex-
tended by deleting the exemption for educational institutions. 68
 Finally, the
section sought to eliminate the Equal Pay Act's provision exempting executive,
administrative, and professional employees from its coverage." That exemp-
tion had excluded teachers and educational administrators from the protections
" See H.R. REP. NO. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 108 (1971), reprinted in (1972) U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462, 2566.
63 118 CONG. REC. 5802-03, 5815 (1972). 	 •
" The Senate version, S. 659, which did not contain any provisions prohibiting sex dis-
crimination was passed first on August 6, 1971. 117 CONG. REC. 30500 (1971). The House bill,
H.R. 7248, which did contain provisions prohibiting sex discrimination was passed by the House
on November 4, 1971. Id. at 39354. The House, when it considered S. 659, as passed by the
Senate, deleted the substance of the Senate bill and inserted in lieu thereof the contents of H.R.
7248. Id. at 39354, 39374. The resulting bill, S. 659, which now included sex discrimination
bans, then went to the Senate. 118 CONG. REC. 4953 (1972). The Senate offered yet another
substitute. Id. at 4974. This Senate substitute did not contain provisions on sex discrimination.
See id. at 4974-5013. Ultimately, by amendment on the Senate floor, id. at 5802-03, sex discrimi-
nation prohibitions were incorporated into the substitute Senate bill. Id. at 5815. This substitute
bill was enacted by the Senate. Id. at 6277. The House objected to the Senate substitute bill as
passed and moved for a conference. Id. at 7540, 7562-63. The Senate agreed to a conference. Id.
at 7961. A conference bill, S. 659, the Education Amendments of 1972, which included title IX,
was reported by the conference committee. Id. at 18451-517. See S. CONF. REP. NO. 798, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2608. This bill was agreed
to in the Senate, 118 CONG. REC. 18862 (1972), and in the House. Id at 20340. The bill became
law on June 27, 1972 when it was approved by the President. Id. at 22702.
65 See note 64 supra.
66
 H.R. 16098, 805, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 4072 (1970). For the text
of section 805 see Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the
Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Section 805 Hearings]. See 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1976).
" H.R. 16098, 805(a), Section 805 Hearings, supra note 66, at 1.
" H.R. 16098, 5 805(b), Section 805 Hearings, supra note 66, at 1. See 42 U.S.C.
5 2000e-1 (1970) (amended 1972).
69 H.R. 16098, 5 805(d), Section 805 Hearings, supra note 66, at 1. See 29 U.S.C. 5 213(a)
(1970) (amended 1972).
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of the Equal Pay Act." Thus, what eventually was to become section 901 of
title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 originally was introduced as a
simple amendment to include sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination in title
VI. Significantly, title VI does not regulate employment." Employment was to
be regulated under the other provisions of the section.
There are other indications that, in its genesis, title IX was not considered
to include employment. For example, during the hearings on this section of the
bill, a representative of the Justice Department suggested that, instead of
amending title VI, separate legislation be enacted that would prohibit sex dis-
crimination in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance and
that this prohibition be extended to employment discrimination." The Justice
Department submitted a bill embodying their proposed alternative in two
subsections." The first subsection contained the same language as what was to
become section 901 of title IX. 74 The second subsection explicitly stated that
discrimination on the basis of sex was prohibited in an educational institution's
employment practices." This proposed bill was not acted upon by the House,
but it does show that the language which became section 901 of title IX was not
interpreted by the Justice Department as covering employment practices and
that this information was conveyed to a Subcommittee of the House Commit-
tee that drafted title IX."
Although the 1970 bill was not passed, it did form the basis of the House
version of the Education Amendments of 1972." Instead of amending title VI,
the new bill contained title IX, which prohibited sex discrimination in federally
7° See 29 U.S.C. 5 213(a) (1970) (amended 1972). See also 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
71 42 U.S.C. 2000d-3 (1976).
72 Section 805 Hearings, supra note 66, at 677-78.
" Id. at 690-91.
7* Compare 2(a) of the Justice Department proposal, Section 805 Hearings, supra note 66,
at 690 with 5 901 of title IX, 20 U.S.C. S 1681 (1976).
75 Section 2(b) of the Justice Department proposal provided that:
No recipient of Federal financial assistance for an education program or activity
shall, because of an individual's sex,
(1) fail or refuse to hire (except in instances where sex is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification) or discharge that individual, or otherwise discriminate against
him or her with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment; or
(2) limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive that individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adverse-
ly affect his or her status as an employee.
Section 805 Hearings, supra note 66, at 690-91.
76 The House Committee on Education and Labor drafted title IX. See H.R. REP. NO.
554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. I, 51.52 (1971), reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2462, 2511-12.
77 H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See H.R. REP. NO. 554, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 1-2 (1971), reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462, 2463. The title and
section numbers used herein are the same as those contained in the final, enacted version of the
Education Amendments of 1972. In earlier versions, title IX was designated as title X and the
sections were numbered 1001, 1002, 1003, etc. rather than sections 901, 902, 903, etc.
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assisted educational institutions and explicitly stated that employment prac-
tices were exempted from this prohibition. 78 Other sections of title IX provided
for the deletion of title VII's exemption for employment in education and the
deletion of the exemption for executive, administrative, and professional
employees in the Equal Pay Act just as the 1970 bill had done. 79
 Thus,
although the ,House now proposed to create a new title for discrimination in
education, rather than merely amend title VI, it did not intend that title to
cover employment in the education field.
An examination of the House Committee Report on this bil1 80 demon-
strates that when the Committee mentioned employment discrimination, it was
referring to title VII and the Equal Pay Act. a' For example, the Committee
Report referred to employment discrimination as being an area related to sec-
tion 901's basic prohibition and discussed the problem of sex discrimination in
employment in conjunction with its description of title VII and the Equal Pay
Act provisions." This careful demarcation of the sections in the House bill is
significant given that the bill contained an explicit exemption for employment
under section 901 83 because it demonstrates that the House thought employ-
ment discrimination was only a related area to section 901. Therefore, an in-
ference can be drawn that the House did not believe employment discrimina-
tion would be covered under title IX even in the absence of an explicit exemp-
tion. The exemption's existence has been explained as having been in-
advertently included since title IX was patterned after title VI which contained
such an exemption."
Thus, throughout the evolution of title IX in the House of Representa-
tives, it was never thought or intended that employment would be covered
under title IX. In the final House version of title IX, there was an express pro-
vision that excluded employment. The Committee Report strongly suggests,
however, that even if there were no express provision exempting it, the House
believed that employment discrimination would only be covered under the
Equal Pay Act and title VII.
B. Senate History
On the whole, the history of title IX in the Senate also indicates that em-
ployment was not intended to be a part of title IX's protection. Unlike the
78 H.R. 7248, §§ 1001-1004, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 117 CONG REC.
39098-99 (1971).
" H.R. 7248, § 1006, § 1008, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 39099
(1971).
8° H.R. REP. NO. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2462.
81 Id. at 2511-12.
82 Id. at 2512.
83 H.R. 7248, § 1004, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 39099 (1971).
a4
	 O'Hara, who was one of the drafters of title IX, declared that the in-
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House version, title IX did not originate in the education bill drafted by the
Senate, but was added on as an amendment to the education bill when it was
on the Senate floor." The Senate version of title IX originated as an attempted
amendment that was not accepted. The history of this attempted amendment
will be examined first because it contained the same language as title IX in its
final form. A second amendment was accepted and became title IX of the bill.
The history of this actual title IX provision in the Senate will then be discussed.
In addition to prohibiting sex discrimination in education, the actual title
IX provisions adopted by the Senate contained the provisions from the House
version amending title VII and the Equal Pay Act which explains why
references to employment were made in connection with title IX. A detailed
examination of comments and dialogues of Senator Bayh, the amendment's
sponsor, will follow because of their importance to the courts in arriving at a
determination whether or not title IX extends to employment discrimination.
Possible alternative interpretations of these comments will be presented which
demonstrate that the better view is that Senator Bayh's comments are not
evidence of an intention to include employment under title IX. This review will
conclude that congressional intention to include employment within title IX's
coverage can not be proven from the Senate history as a whole.
While the Senate education bill was pending on the Senate floor, Senator
Birch Bayh offered an amendment which provided for the prohibition of sex
discrimination in educational institutions." This amendment was not accept-
ed," but it did form the basis of title IX as it was finally enacted by the
Senate. 88 This precursor to title IX illustrates that title IX's language was not
interpreted or intended to include employment in its coverage. During the floor
debates on this proposed amendment, the amendment's sponsor, Senator
Bayh, clearly and precisely stated that the intended scope of his amendment
was to provide equal access for students." He did not mention employees." In
addition, Senator Bayh specifically construed the amendment's language as
elusion of the employment exemption was a drafting error because it was a cut and paste job of
title VI. He further stated that significance should not be assigned to the deletion of the employ-
ment exemption at conference. These comments, however, were made after title IX was enacted.
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on title
IX regulations].
" S. 659, amend. 398, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 30155 (1971).
86 Id.
" Id. at 30412.
as 118 CONG. REC. 5808, 5815 (1972). Compare S. 659, amend. 398, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 30156 (1971) with 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682 (1976).
89 Senator Bayh stated "[w]hat we are trying to do is provide equal access for women
and men students to the educational process and the extracurricular activities in a school, where
there is not a unique facet such as football involved." 117 CONG. REC. 30407 (1971) (emphasis
added).
90 See 117 CONG. REC. 30407 (1971).
July 19811	 TITLE IX	 1111
not doing anything more than title VI does, 9 ' and title VI does not extend to
employment practices. 92
In spite of these clear statements, other remarks made by Senator Bayh
before he introduced this amendment have been construed as indicating, at the
very least, an initial intention to prohibit employment discrimination through
title IX' s language. 93
 These remarks concerned the widespread problem of dis-
crimination in both admissions and employment in education." These
remarks, however, were not made with specific reference to the provision of the
amendment, but rather were a part of his introduction aimed at directing Con-
gress's attention to the major discrimination problems existing in educational
institutions. Further, these comments were made at the same time Senator
Bayh stated his amendment was needed to ensure access to higher education
and guarantee an equal educational opportunity for women." Moreover,
Senator Bayh did not discuss employment in his explanation of the amend-
ment. 96
 Employment was not mentioned by Senator Bayh or any other
Senators throughout the debate." Thus, it does not appear to have been con-
templated that this amendment would include a prohibition against employ-
ment discrimination.
Although when it was first introduced, this proposed amendment was
ruled non-germane," as noted above, it formed the basis for the actual title IX
amendment that was introduced and adopted the following year. 99
 The actual
91 Senator Bayh specifically stated that,
[S]o far as involvement or supervision by the Secretary of HEW is concerned, we
really are not doing anything to the private school that is not now in the law under
title VI of the Civil Rights Act, relating to discrimination in other areas.
We are saying that the power which now resides in the Federal Government
over private institutions shall be extended. We are only adding the 3-letter [sic]
word "sex" to existing law.
117 CONG. REC. 30408 (1971).
92 See 42 U.S.C. 2000d-3 (1976).
95
 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
94 Id. The North Haven court relied on the following remarks made by Senator Bayh
before he introduced his amendment:
While over 50 percent of our population is female, there is no effective protection
for them as they seek admission and employment in educational facilities. The anti-
discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not deal with sex dis-
crimination by our institutions of higher learning.
Today, women seeking employment in higher education face an array of obstacles
almost as insuperable as those which used to face blacks.
Id. (citing 117 CONG. REC. 30155-56 (1971)) (emphasis added by the court).
95
 117 CONG. REC. 30155 (1971).
96 See id. at 30155-58, 30399-415 (1971).
" Id. at 30399-415.
98 Id. at 30412, 30415.
" The amendment was introduced on February 28, 1972, 118 CONG. REC. 5802-03
(1972), and adopted on the same day, id. at 5815.
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title IX amendment incorporated "not only the key provisions of [the] earlier
amendment, but also the strongest points of the antidiscrimination amend-
ments approved by the House."'°° These House amendments proposed the
deletion of title VII' s exemption for educational institutions and the removal of
the exception for executive, administrative, and professional personnel from
the Equal Pay Act."' As a result of the addition of these provisions from the
House amendments, the amendment introduced in the Senate was a package
containing three major provisions. The first provision, section 901, prohibited
sex discrimination in federally'assisted programs or activities in educational in-
stitutions. 1 °2 Second, the amendment compelled educational institutions to
comply with title VII' s prohibition against employment discrimination by
deleting the educational institution exemption from title VID° 3 The third ma-
jor provision prohibited wage discrimination on the basis of sex among ex-
ecutive, administrative, and professional employees by removing this excep-
tion from the Equal Pay Act.'" These last two provisions explicitly govern
employment practices, whereas title IX is silent concerning employment.
Therefore, the logical conclusion is that employment coverage was being added
to the amendment under the title VII and the Equal Pay Act provisions, rather
than being included under title IX. Even if it could be argued that Senator
Bayh originally intended employment to be covered by his earlier amendment,
the expansion of this second amendment to include the employment provisions
from the House bill indicates that student discrimination was being separated
from employment discrimination.
Comments made by Senator Bayh and exchanges between him and other
Senate members during the course of the Senate debate on this amendment
have been pivotal in the courts' resolution of the conflict over title IX's employ-
ment coverage. 1 °5 The courts have relied heavily on their interpretation of
Senator Bayh's comments in deciding whether or not employment is covered
under title IX.'" These comments are subject to differing interpretations by
the courts because of unclear remarks made by Senator Bayh while the amend-
ment was pending in the Senate. Senator Bayh introduced his amendment by
explaining that:
i°° Id. at 5808.
'°' Compare H.R. 7248, 55 1001-1009, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 39098-99
(1971) with S, 659, amend. 398, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REC. 30156-57 (1971) and S.
659, amend. 874, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REC. 5803 (1972).
'" S. 659, amend. 874, 5 1001, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REC. 5803 (1972).
10 ' Id.	 1005.
"4 Id. 5 1009.
105 See, Dougherty County School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1980);
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 779-82 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub
nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v, Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986); Romeo Community
Schools v, HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro
School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 427-28 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
c os
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It is clear to me that sex discrimination reaches into all facets of edu-
cation — admissions, scholarship programs, faculty hiring and pro-
motion, professional staffing and pay scales. .
The only antidote is a comprehensive amendment such as the one now
before the Senate.
Amendment 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in exist-
ing legislation relating to general education programs. ... More
specifically, the heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex dis-
crimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds. The
amendment would cover such crucial aspects as admissions pro-
cedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited excep-
tions. Enforcement powers include fund termination provisions —
and appropriate safeguards — parallel to those found in title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Other important provisions in the amend-
ment would extend the equal employment opportunities provisions of
title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, and
extend the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive, ad-
ministrative and professional women. 107
These remarks by Senator Bayh have been interpreted by one court as "quite
clearly" referring to faculty employment in conjunction with section 901 of title
IX as well as to the "[o]ther important provisions" dealing with title VII and
the Equal Pay Acti° 8
This interpretation fails to recognize that Senator Bayh used two terms,
"amendment" and "provision," in his explanation of the scope of his amend-
ment. Logically, the term "amendment" was used when discussing the entire
package, and the term "provision" was used when discussing a specific portion
of the amendment package. Senator Bayh began his introduction by referring
to the amendment — the entire package — in broad terms.'° 9
 He then referred to
the heart of the amendment, the provision creating section 901, because it was
something new."° Sex discrimination was being prohibited in education for the
first time, while the other provisions, although significant, merely broadened
the coverage of existing statutes. The discussion then shifted back to the areas
covered by the amendment. After that, Senator Bayh explained that the enforce-
ment powers included but were not limited to those provided in title IX, and
then he referred to the "[o]ther important provisions," namely, title VII and
the Equal Pay Act amendments."' At this point, Senator Bayh was distin-
guishing the "[o]ther important provisions" from the preceding discussion of
107 118 CONC. REC. 5803 (1972) (emphasis added).
1 " North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted su6 nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
HD' See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972).
110
"I Id.
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title IX's enforcement powers. He was not distinguishing the title VII and
Equal Pay Act provisions from the broad discussion of the amendment. So
viewed, it becomes apparent that Senator Bayh referred to employment only
when he was talking about the amendment and not when he was discussing the
individual provision of section 901 of title IX.
In addition to his introductory remarks, an oral summation of his amend-
ment and its contents given by Senator Bayh on the Senate floor"' has been the
focus of judicial scrutiny."' This summation supports a finding that employ-
ment was meant to be covered under title VII and the Equal Pay Act, not
under title IX. This summation was divided into four parts. The first section of
the summation was entitled "A. Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Federally
Funded Education Programs."" 4
 The following section, labeled "B. Prohibi-
tion of Education-Related Employment Discrimination," described the amend-
ments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act."' The first part of section A began
with Senator Bayh stating that "[c]entral to my amendment are sections 1001-
1005. . . ."" 6
 Later in this discussion of sections 1001-1005, Senator Bayh ex-
plained that "[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas
where abuse has been mentioned — employment practices for faculty and ad-
ministrators, scholarship aid, admissions, access to programs within the institu-
tion such as vocational education classes and so forth."'" Sections 1001-1004
created the title IX prohibition against sex discrimination in educational institu-
tions, and section 1005 amended title VII." 8
The proposed amendment to title VII was also discussed in section B, the
second part of the summary. Consequently, it has been asserted that the men-
tion of section 1005 in the first part of the summary was simply an oversight, " 9
and, therefore, Senator Bayh's reference to employment in the above-quoted
statement indicates that section 901 of title IX prohibits employment discrimi-
nation. 12 ° This argument, however, does not hold up for several reasons. First,
the conclusion that the discussion of title VII under section B means its discus-
sion under section A was a mistake is an assumption without sound basis. Title
VII' s inclusion in both sections A and B is reasonable. In section A of the sum-
mation, Senator Bayh in effect stated that sections 1001-1005 — title IX and
title VII together — would cover all of the areas of sex discrimination in edu-
12 118 CONG. REC. 5806-08 (1972).
"' North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986); Islesboro
School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 428 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
n' Id.
116 Id.
" Id.
See id. at 5803. These sections were later renumbered 901-905. See H. CONF. REP.
No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 18452, 18493-94 (1972).
119
 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v, Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 781 ni 1 (2d Cir. 1980), cert,
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
124 Id.
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cational institutions."' Since either title IX or title VII by itself would leave
gaps in the coverage of this area, together they were ''[c]entral to [his] amend-
ment. . . ." 122
 Section B of the summation was then used to explain the need
for the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act.'" Viewed in this light,
title VII's inclusion in both sections A and B of the summation makes perfectly
good sense. Second, it is less reasonable to assume that Senator Bayh did not
know which sections of his amendment were which or that he made a careless
error, than that he intentionally grouped the title IX and title VII amendments
together in section A. Finally, the conclusion that this reference to title VII in
the first part of the summary was an oversight does not constitute an analysis of
the legislative history as it exists; it is instead an attempt to rewrite it. There-
fore, Senator Bayh's summation supports the view that employment is not in-
cluded under title IX because he included title VII in section A where he men-
tioned employment and there would have been no need to do so if title IX
covered employment practices.
Following this summation, a section-by-section summary also was printed
in the Congressional Record. 124 It began with a description of section 1001, the
principal section of title IX, under the heading "Basic Prohibition."'" This de-
scription did not mention employment. 126 The summary also included a de-
scription of section 1005, the title VII amendment, under the heading
"Employment Discrimination." 127
 These explanations of the provisions, along
with the descriptive word headings, suggest that employment discrimination
was intended to be covered only under title VII and the Equal Pay Act, not
under title IX.
After Senator Bayh finished his presentation, the floor was opened for
questions and debate. One particular exchange that discussed employment'"
has been much examined and is the subject of controversy.'" The dialogue
began with Senator Pell asking Senator Bayh whether sections 1001(a) and (b)
excluded admissions practices of nonpublic institutions at the elementary and
secondary level.'" Senator Bayh replied that they were not covered and then
stated that three different types of discrimination were being dealt with, admis-
sions, available student services, and employment.' 3 ' He stated that there were
no exceptions to the types of employment covered in the area of employment.
12 ' See 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
122 Id.
23 Id.
24 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972).
125 Id.
26 Id.
122 Id.
26 Id. at 5812-13 (remarks of Sen. Bayh and Sen. Pell).
23
 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986); Islesboro
School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 427 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
1 " 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972).
"' Id.
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He was then asked if the faculty of private schools would have to reflect a sexual
balance and he pronounced that the amendment only guaranteed equality of op-
portunity.' 32
 In response to further inquiries, Senator Bayh stated that the em-
ployment practices of educational institutions controlled by religious organiza-
tions and military schools were explicitly excluded from coverage.'"
While it has been argued that this dialogue reveals Senator Bayh's clear
intention to include employment in section 901 of title IX because his responses
would not have made sense if it were not included,' 34 other explanations are
possible. In the first exchange, Senator Bayh's response was divided into three
sections, two of which — admissions and services — were aimed specifically at
students, the third — employment — at employees.'" While his response was
more extended than necessary for a direct answer to the question, it does not
prove that title IX encompasses employment practices. It is important to note
that in response to the question about the sexual balance of faculty, Senator
Bayh responded that the amendment only guaranteed equality of opportunity. 136
He did not discuss it in terms of what title IX required. He instead referred to
the entire amendment package. Thus, when the discussion was centered on
employment, it is probable that Senator Bayh was referring to title VII.
This explanation is not defeated by Senator Bayh's responses concerning
the exclusions for teachers at schools run by religious organizations and mili-
tary schools. First, the Senate amendment, unlike the House version, con-
tained an exemption under title VII for educational institutions with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con-
nected with its religious activities.'" Second, with respect to the exclusion for
military schools, title VII already contained a provision that an employer is not
required to hire any individual who does not fulfill a requirement imposed
under the security program where national security is concerned.'" Thus,
while Senator Bayh's language is somewhat ambiguous here, the more reason-
able view is that all references to employment were references to title VII,
rather than title IX. Therefore, even if Senator Bayh's intention was that title
IX cover employment, it was never clearly manifested to the Senate.
There is nothing in the Senate debates that makes it clear that Congress
thought title IX and employment were connected. Extreme caution should be
exercised in attaching congressional intent to ambiguous and obscure state-
ments. In sum, this examination of title IX from its inception in the Senate to
its final passage in the Senate demonstrates that, on the whole, the Senate
I" Id.
'" Id. at 5812-13.
134
 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 782 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
'" See 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972).
136 Id.
"7 S. 659, amend. 874,	 1003(6)(1), 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 5803
(1972).
"$ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (1976).
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history does not manifest an intention to have title IX incorporate employment
practices in its prohibition of sex discrimination.
After the Senate passed its education bill,'" which contained the title IX
amendments, the bill went to conference along with the House version.'" At
conference, the House provision explicitly exempting employment from title
IX's basic prohibition was deleted without explanation"' and the resulting bill
became law.'" The deletion of title IX's explicit employment exemption will
be examined and explained in conjunction with the analysis of title IX's proto-
type, title VI, in section IV of this note.'"
III. POST-PASSAGE DEVELOPMENTS
Certain post-passage developments concerning title IX have been cited as
providing evidence that employment discrimination was intended to be pro-
hibited by title IX.'" First, after title IX was enacted, Senator Bayh stated that
title IX did cover employment.'" Second, Congress did not disapprove the
regulations promulgated by HEW regulating the employment practices of edu-
cational institutions."6
 This section, however, will show that these post-
passage developments are of no effect because they cannot be used as evidence
of legislative intent or purpose. In addition, it will be demonstrated that Con-
gress's failure to disapprove the HEW regulations does not support the view
that employment is governed by title IX.
Senator Bayh's comments, made after title IX's passage, were clear ex-
pressions of his personal view that title IX does encompass employment. These
comments, however, contrast sharply with the absence of any such clear ex-
pressions while his amendment was pending. The absence of any forthright
statements by Senator Bayh that employment was covered under title IX
before title IX's passage indicates that if he had this intention at that time, he
was unclear about it. Thus, the Senate may not have intended the inclusion of
employment under title IX despite Senator Bayh's later assertions that it did.
After title IX was enacted, a summary of title IX's requirements was
prepared by Bernice Sandler of the Association of American Colleges and
19 118 CONG. REC. 6277 (1972).
' 4° See id. at 7563, 7961.
in See H. CONF. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONC. REC. 18452 (1972);
S. CONF. REP. NO. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2608.
"2 See 118 CONC. REC. 18862, 20340, 22702 (1972). The title IX provision amending
title VII was deleted prior to the Act's enrollment as public law because the title VII amendment
had already been enacted in another bill. See The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 3, 86 Stat. 103-04 (1972) amending 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-1 (1970).
1 " See text and notes at notes 190-96 infra.
1" See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 782, 783-84 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No.
80-986).
' 45 See 118 CONG. REC. 24684 n.1 (1972). Set also Hearings on title IX regulations, supra note
84, at 173.
146 See text and notes at notes 155-68 infra.
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printed in the Congressional Record at Senator Bayh's request.'*' This sum-
mary stated that title IX's provisions are patterned after title VI, a. nd in a foot-
note to this statement, Sandler stated that "[t] itle VI also specifically excludes
employment from coverage. . . . There is no similar exemption for employment
in the sex discrimination provisions relating to federally assisted education pro-
grams."'" The language in this footnote and Senator Bayh's implicit endorse-
ment of it suggest that after title IX was enacted, Senator Bayh supported the
position that title IX covers employment. Although it is the sponsors that are
looked to when the meaning of statutory words are in doubt,'" it is the spon-
sor's statements that are made while the Act is pending that are accorded sub-
stantial weight in interpreting the statute, not those statements made after its
passage' 5° because "statutes are construed by the courts with reference to the
circumstances existing at the time of the passage."'" In the words of the
United States Supreme Court, "post-passage remarks of legislators, however
explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed
before the Act's passage. . . . Such statements 'represent only the personal
views of these legislators since the statements were [made] after passage of the
Act.' " 152 As a result, only those comments made by Senator Bayh before title
IX's passage can be used as evidence of congressional intent, and those com-
ments were, at best, unclear about the scope of title IX regarding employ-
ment.'" It was only after title IX's enactment that Senator Bayh more clearly
suggested that employment was covered. Such post-passage comments do not
indicate legislative intent and cannot be used to demonstrate the Senate's in-
tent at the time it was passed.
Another post-passage development that has been cited in support of the
view that title IX covers employment is Congress's failure to disapprove the
HEW regulations on employment.'" Three years after title IX was enacted,
HEW's final title IX regulations were published.' 55 Before they could go into
effect, however, they had to undergo a statutorily mandated review by Con-
gress.'" The statute required agency regulations to be sent to Congress, and it
'" 118 CONG. REC. 24683-85 (1972).
'" Id. at 24684 n.1 (emphasis in original).
149 Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976);
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967). But see Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) (remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not con-
trolling in analyzing legislative history).
1 " Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974); United States v.
United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947).
1 " United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962).
'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) (quoting Na-
tional Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 n.34 (1967)).
"3 See text and notes at notes 105.39 supra.
1 " Sec North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
'" 40 Fed. Reg. 24127 (1975).
"6 See 20 U.S.C. 1232(d)(1) (1976). This was made applicable to title IX by 20 U.S.C.
5 1232(f) (1976) which became effective August 21, 1974.
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provided that they would take effect forty-five days later unless Congress, by
concurrent resolution, found the regulations to be inconsistent with the
authorizing act and disapproved them.'" Pursuant to this mandate, the HEW
regulations were laid before Congress.'" Resolutions were introduced in both
the House and the Senate but no action was taken on the Senate resolutions.' 59
Of the four resolutions introduced in the House,' 6° only one had any action
taken on it.' 6 ' An amendment to this one resolution sought specifically to
disapprove the employment sections of the regulations.' 62
The House Subcommittee on Post-Secondary Education held six days of
hearings to determine whether the regulations were consistent with title IX.'"
During these hearings, Senator Bayh testified in support of the HEW regula-
tions, stating that HEW's "title IX guidelines, as the Congress mandated, call
for equality in admissions, financial aid, course offerings, career counseling,
and in the case of teachers and other educational personnel, employment, pay
and promotions.'"" This is just another post-passage comment that reflects
Senator Bayh's personal view, not congressional intent. At this point, Senator
Bayh could strive for the broadest application of title IX since it had already
been passed and the regulations promulgated.
After these hearings, the Subcommittee reported the resolution to the full
committee, which voted to refer it to the Equal Opportunities Subcom-
1 " The statute provides in pertinent part that:
Concurrently with the publication in the Federal Register of any final regulation
as required in subsection (b) of this section, such final regulation shall be trans-
mitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate. Such final regulations shall become effective not less than forty-five days
after such transmission unless the Congress shall, by concurrent resolution, find
that the final regulation is inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its
authority and disapprove such regulation.
20 U.S.C.	 1232(d)(1) (1976).
"8
 Senator Helms stated that the regulations were submitted to the Senate 'on June 3,
1975. 121 CONG. REC. 17301 (1975). The regulations were submitted to the House on June 4,
1975. Executive Communication 1168, 121 CONG. REC. 16924 (1975).
19 On June 5, 1975, Senator Helms introduced a concurrent resolution which was a
blanket disapproval of the regulations. S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
17301 (1975). On July 16, 1975, Senator Laxalt introduced a resolution disapproving those sec-
tions of the regulations regulating athletics. S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG.
REC. 22940 (1975). According to Senator Helms, the Senate Committee met in executive session
on his resolution and without conducting any public hearings decided not to report the resolution
to the full Senate. 121 CONG. REC. 23846 (1975).
in Representative Martin introduced two resolutions: a broad disapproval of the
regulations and a disapproval of the athletic regulations. H.R. Con. Res. 310 and H.R. Con.
Res. 311, 94th Cong., I st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 19209 (1975). On July 8, 1975, two resolutions
were introduced by Representative O'Hara for himself and seven other Representatives. H.R.
Con. Res. 329 and H.R. Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 21687 (1975).
/61
 This was H.R. Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See Hearings on title IX
regulations, supra note 84, at 1.
isa Unpublished Amendment to H.R. Con. Res. 330, Hearings on tide IX regulations, supra
note 84, on file with the House Committee on Education and Labor.
163
 See Hearings on title IX regulations, supra note 84.
' 6' Id. at 173.
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mittee.' 65 This subcommittee held a one-day hearing, 166 and then recom-
mended that the full committee reject the resolution."' It was never passed out
of the Committee. Thus, no concurrent resolution was passed by either House
of Congress and HEW's regulations went into effect.'
That Congress did not disapprove the regulations should not be given any
weight with respect to Congress's intent at the time it passed title IX. First,
congressional inaction cannot operate to make a regulation into an Act of Con-
gress. 169 If employment is not within the scope of title IX as enacted, as
evidenced by the statutory language and legislative history, the failure of Con-
gress to disapprove the employment regulations after its passage cannot change
it so that it is within the scope of title IX. 170
Second, congressional inaction should not be construed as approval. At
the time Congress reviewed the HEW regulations, it was in the process of pass-
ing an amendment to the review statute.'"' This amendment, added four
months after the title IX regulations took effect, stated that the failure of Con-
gress to adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving a regulation shall neither
represent an approval or finding of consistency with its authorizing Act, nor
shall it be construed as evidence of such in establishing a prima facie case, an
inference, or a presumption in any judicial proceeding. 172 Although this
amendment had not yet taken effect when the HEW regulations were re-
viewed, its adoption shows that Congress did not approve of congressional in-
action being used in support of a regulation. Thus, the absence of congres-
sional disapproval of the title IX regulations should not be used as evidence
that employment is covered under title IX.'"
Furthermore, only a few members of the House and Senate considered
and voted on the merits of any of the resolutions in committee.' 74 A committee
is not Congress, therefore, committee inaction is not necessarily indicative of
congressional intent and purpose in enacting title IX.'"
"5 33 CONG. Q. 1484 (1975).
166 Hearing on House Concurrent Resolution 330 (Title IX Regulation) Before the Subcomm. on
Equal Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
167 Id. at 39-40.
"8 The regulations went into effect on July 21, 1975. See 40 Fed. Reg. ii (July 21, 1975);
121 CONG. REC. 23846 (1975).
I" Every bill must pass both the House of Representatives and the Senate and then be
presented to the President. If the President signs it, it becomes law. If he does not take any action
within ten days, the bill will become law. If the President returns it to the Congress, both Houses
must approve the bill by a two-thirds vote in order for the bill to become law. U.S. CONST. art. I,
5 7, cl. 2.
170 See text at notes 151.52 supra.
1 " H.R. 7217, 5 13, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 25530 (1975).
172 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 5 7(b), 89 Stat. 796 (amending 20 U.S.C. 1232(d)(I) (Supp.
IV 1974)).
1 " Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 428 n.3 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
174 See text and notes at notes 159-68 supra.
1 " After the HEW regulations became effective, Senator McClure sought to amend title
IX. He stated:
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In sum, post-passage comments are not indicative of congressional intent
at the time an Act is passed. Therefore, Senator Bayh's statements concerning
title IX's coverage of employment represent only a personal view that cannot
be used as evidence of Congress's intent when it enacted title IX. Further,
Congress's failure to disapprove the HEW employment regulations should not
be used in determining congressional intent for two reasons. First, Congress
has declared expressly through legislation that failure to disapprove a regula-
tion does not represent approval of it, and second, the entire Congress did not
have an opportunity to disapprove the regulations because none of the resolu-
tions ever got out of committee.
IV. TITLE VI'S HISTORY
Title VI, which was the prototype for title IX, 16
 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance.'" While title VI has an express exemption
for employment that title IX does not have, 18 title VI's legislative history
reveals that even without this exemption Congress did not interpret the
Those of us who would have [the tide IX regulations] put back into the context of
the original congressional enactment are faced with the frustration of a committee
that desires to overreach, but is not expressive of the will of the majority of Con-
gress. That is absolutely the case in this particular matter, because there is no
question that Congress did not intend the length and breadth of the regulations
under title IX... .
. . I say that with respect to title IX, because there are a number of us, who,
for 2 years have been trying to get this committee to act on title IX regulations and
the committee refuses to act.
122 CONG. Rec. 28144 (1976).
Another argument which has been made in rejecting the contention that Congress's
failure to disapprove HEW's employment regulations proves that employment is included under
title IX is that the regulations came before Congress three years after title IX was enacted. See
Comment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires
Challenges, 1976 B . U. L. REV. 133, 156-57, which argues that although there was a substantial
continuity of membership between the 92d Congress, which enacted title IX, and the 94th Con-
gress, which reviewed the HEW regulations, there were many members in the 94th Congress
who did not take part in title IX's enactment. In support of this contention, the article reports
that thirteen of the forty members of the House Committee on Education and Labor of the 94th
Congress were not members of the 92d Congress and, therefore, had no direct access to the intent
of Congress other than the legislative history of title IX. Id.
On the day the HEW regulations became effective, a bill proposing to limit several areas
of title IX's coverage, including employment, was introduced. S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
121 CONG. REC. 23845-47 (1975). The sponsor, Senator Helms, declared that the reason he was
introducing this bill was because HEW effectively had rewritten title IX by extending its scope
beyond that authorizd by title IX. Id. at 23845. This bill was never adopted. Once again, this is a
post-passage event, which should have no bearing on a determination of congressional intent at
the time title IX was enacted.
"6 See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 5803, 5807 (1972).
'" Section 601 of title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1976). Title IX's language is substantially similar. See
text at note 2 supra.
' 7" 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d-3 (1976).
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language in title VI as including employment practices. Thus, the legislative
history of title VI is instructive in interpreting the scope of title IX's coverage.
Possible explanations for the deletion of title IX's employment exemption at
conference will then be explored.
When title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was introduced originally in
the House of Representatives, its first section, section 601, contained language
expressly prohibiting employment discrimination in federally assisted pro-
grams.'" Subsequently, this version of title VI was revised by the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary so that the language relating to employment was
deleted.' 8° This revision became section 601 of title VI as it was finally enacted
by the House. 1 e' Logically, when the House Committee deleted the express
prohibition against employment discrimination, it intended to remove employ-
ment from title VI's coverage. Similarly, when Congress used nearly identical
language in title IX, without mentioning employment, it intended not to in-
clude employment.
In considering title VI, members of both the House and the Senate em-
phasized that the revised version of title VI applied only to the beneficiaries of
federal programs and did not cover those employed in connection with such
programs.'" For example, during the hearings before the House Rules Com-
mittee, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee stated that title VI
was concerned only with the integration of students.'" He noted specifically
128 H.R. 7152, § 601, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 11252 (1963) in pertinent
part provided that, "k]ll contracts made in connection with any such program or activity shall
contain such conditions as the President may prescribe for the purpose of assuring that there shall
be no discrimination in employment by any contractor or subcontractor on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin." Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 659 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights Hearings].
"° Subcommittee No. 5 of the House judiciary Committee met in executive session and
struck out of H.R. 7152, as amended, all after the enacting clause and inserted in lieu thereof an
amendment in the nature of a substitute. H.R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963),
reprinted in (1964) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2392. The text of the substitute version
of title VI is found in H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1963).
Title VII was also revised from its original three sections, see Civil Rights Hearings, supra
note 178, at 659, to its expanded and strengthened final form to cover employment more
thoroughly. See H,R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-15 (1963).
181 110 CONG. REC. 15896, 15897 (1964).
182 Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 198 (1964) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7152 Hearings] (statements of Rep. Caller); id. at 228
(statement of Rep. McCulloch).
Before section 601's language was revised, Senator Ervin declared that title VI was
closely related to title VII because part of title VI dealt with the same question as title VII. Civil
Rights — The President's Program, 1963: Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judicial)), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 331 (1963). After title VI's revision, Senator Ervin commented
that the revision of title VI deleting the second sentence of title VI removed the provisions per-
taining to the Fair Employment Practices Committee procedure. Id. at 335.
Also a letter from the Attorney General, which was twice printed in the Congressional
Record, declared that title VI would not cover employment unless employees were the intended
beneficiaries of federal funding. 110 CONG. REC. 10076, 11941 (1964).
187 H.R. 7152 Hearings, supra note 182, at 198 (statement of Rep. Caller).
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that employment was not covered. As an example, he declared that discrimina-
tion against a dishwasher employed by a recipient of federal aid would not be
protected from possible employment discrimination by title VI.'" Thus, the .
history of title VI in the House reveals that title VI's language was not meant
to include employment.
The legislative history of title VI in the Senate leads to the same conclu-
sion. There, an amendment in the way of a substitute for the version of the bill
passed by the House was introduced.'" This substitute included a new provi-
sion added to title VI, section 604, which explicitly exempted employment. 196
There was no specific discussion on the Senate floor about this particular por-
tion of the amendment, and it became a part of title VI when the whole
substitute was adopted by the Senate.'" In explaining the substitute, the
Senate floor manager of title VI emphasized that no substantive changes had
been made in title VI. 188
 He declared that any language change was only to
make explicit the declared intention of title VI. 189 The Senate history demon-
strates that title VI's explicit employment exemption was not deemed neces-
sary for employment to be excluded from title VI's coverage. Therefore, the
absence of an explicit exemption in title IX does not support the view that
employment is included in title IX's prohibition.
As originally passed by the House, title IX contained a provision, section
904, which paralleled section 604 of title VI, explicitly excluding employ-
ment. 190
 This section was deleted at conference without explanation. 19 ' The
Conference Report simply stated that the House receded. 192 Thus, the provi-
sion was deleted. The absence of a provision in title IX explicitly exempting
employment from coverage was viewed by one court as a key factor in deter-
mining that title IX extends to employment. 193 While this conclusion was facili-
tated by Congress's failure to explain the deletion, such a conclusion does not
follow ineluctably from the omission of the explicit exemption.
Several arguments can be made to support the conclusion that the
elimination of section 904 was not intended to permit employment coverage
under title IX. First, the inclusion of section 904 in the House bill was nothing
more than a drafting mistake which was corrected at conference by deleting the
section.'" Second, the language of section 901 of title IX should be interpreted
ia4 Id.
1 " H.R. 7152, amend. 656, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 11926-35 (1964).
' 86 Id. at 11930.
187 Id. at 14511.
1 " Id. at 12714.
' 89 Id. (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
19° H.R. 7248, § 904, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 39365 (1972).
191
 S. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 221, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS. 2608, 2671-72.
192
 Id. at 2672.
193 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
194 See Hearings on title IX regulations, supra note 84, at 409 (statement of Rep. O'Hara);
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in the same way as section 601 of title VI was and employment was not thought
to be covered by title VI's language. Further, a reasonable explanation for the
deletion may be that some members of the conference were concerned that the
employment exception in title IX conflicted with the other title IX provisions
amending title VII and the Equal Pay Act so as to - include employment under
their coverage. Therefore, since the employment exclusion provision was
designed only to clarify, it was deleted because it could be the source of confu-
sion.' 95
 Although it is true that if Congress was concerned about any possible
inconsistencies, it could have drafted an exclusion provision applicable only to
section 901 of title IX, 196
 it is equally true that Congress may not have included
an exclusion provision because, as suggested above, it was not deemed
necessary.
In sum, since title VI neither covers employment nor was its language in-
tended to do so, title IX should be interpreted the same way since Congress in-
tended title IX's language to have the same meaning as the parallel title VI
language. That an employment exemption clause was deleted at title IX's con-
ference should not be assumed to mean that employment is covered where
there. is no evidence or indication of Congress's intent to do so.
V. POLICY
An examination of the congressional policy concerning the remedies for
discrimination which are available under title IX provides additional support
for the view that title IX does not encompass employment practices. Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act provide effective remedies for the problem of employ-
ment discrimination. The only remedy that would be added to title VII and the
Equal Pay Act's coverage by title IX is fund termination. This is a severe
remedy that should not be used when other remedies are available. Since other
effective remedies are available under title VII and the Equal Pay Act, Con-
gress could not have intended title IX to apply to the area of employment dis-
crimination.
Section 902 of title IX states the methods of enforcing title IX available to
a federal department.'" It authorizes each federal department and agency that
see note 84 supra.
195
 Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (fith Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979).
16 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
"7 Section 902 provides in pertinent part:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be ef-
fected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under
such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express
finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with
such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular
political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has
been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part
thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found or (2) by any other means
authorized by law: Prodded, however, That no such action ihall be taken until the
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is empowered to extend federal financial assistance to any education program
or activity to investigate reported violations and to initiate action to enforce
compliance if it does not obtain voluntary compliance.'" Compliance may be
effected (I) by a termination of funds after a hearing has been held where a
failure to comply with a requirement was expressly found or (2) by any other
means authorized by law. 199
 Thus, to enforce the title IX regulations, there are
two options. One option is to use "other means authorized by law" which
HEW listed as including but not limited to (1) referring the matter to the
Justice Department with a recommendation that it bring appropriate pro-
ceedings to enforce the regulations or (2) proceeding under state or local law, if
appropriate."° Although title IX created the authority to apply these means to
student sex discrimination, these other means of enforcement were already
provided for sex discrimination in employment under other statutes. Under the
first alternative, the option to proceed is left to the Justice Department and is
also authorized in title VII."' Under the second alternative, there must be a
state right of action in order to proceed, and if there is one, then there is no
need to use title IX. Further, these enforcement provisions are not as detailed
or tailored as those found in title VII or the Equal Pay Act."' Moreover, even
though these options exist under title IX, it does not appear that HEW used
them."' This leaves HEW with the other option — fund termination —
created by title IX.'" Thus, if title IX were to cover employment, this remedy
would be the only new item which title IX would offer to the area of employ-
ment discrimination.
The fund termination option has been declared by the United States
Supreme Court to be a severe remedy that often may not provide an appropri-
ate means of accomplishing title IX's objective of effectively protecting in-
department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of
the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance
cannot be secured by voluntary means.
20 U.S.C. $ 1682 (1976).
199 Id.
199 Id.
4" 45 C.F.R. 80.8 (1979).
'°' 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
202
 Compare 45 C.F.R. $ 80.8 (1979) with 42 U.S.C. §.4 2000e-4(g) and 2000e-5 (1976)
and 29 U.S.C. SS 216(b) and 216(c) (1976).
202 Four of the six cases decided in the circuit courts arose because of threatened cutoff of
funds, while the other two involved a threat of unspecified administrative proceedings that could
have meant a cutoff of funds. See Dougherty County School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 736
(5th Cir. 1980) (deferral of federal funds); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d
773, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981)
(No. 80-986) (administrative proceedings); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993 (9th Cir,
1980) cert. granted sub nom. Department of Educ. v. Seattle Univ,, 101 S.Ct. 563 (1980) (No.
80-493) (cutoff of federal funds); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 583 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (type of administrative enforcement proceeding not
specified); Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119, 120 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (administrative proceeding to terminate funding); Islesboro School
Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (cutoff of federal
funds).
204 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976)
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dividuals against discriminatory practices, where merely an isolated violation
has occurred. 205 Congress itself has recognized the severity of cutting off funds
as a remedy and has described it as a last resort, when all else, including
lawsuits, has failed. 206
Thus, both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have
recognized the severity of HEW' s enforcement power. It, therefore, would
make no sense for Congress to have included employment under title IX when
title VII already addressed this problem and has effective, tailored remedies
that are less harsh on the innocent people involved. Title VII has been
acknowledged as an effective remedy for employment discrimination. Senator
Bayh even stated that title VII "has been extremely effective in helping to
eliminate sex discrimination in employment." 207 Title VII is tailored to address
the problem of employment discrimination and to compensate those discrimi-
nated against with the least possible injury to others. Thus, the only thing that
can be gained under title IX is the fund cutoff provision, and in regard to this
same provision in title VI, it was said that "[a]s a general rule, cutoff of funds
would not be consistent with the objective of the Federal assistance statutes if
other effective means of ending discrimination are available. "208 This view
supports the common sense argument, that innocent people should not be hurt
for the acts of others when it is not necessary. There is no reason for students in
educational programs to suffer as a result of employment discrimination when
there are already effective remedies available under title VII and the Equal Pay
Act which do not injure students. This is particularly true since the same bill
that created title IX also included the amendments that gave school employees
direct and superior remedies for sex discrimination under title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. These remedies involve no loss of student benefits. It seems
more reasonable that Congress would have students bear the burden only
when the objective is to remedy discrimination against fellow students. Even if
it were thought that faculty discrimination adversely affected students, this
discrimination is handled by title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
Consequently, title IX would provide an additional remedy for employ-
ment discrimination that is much more harsh and harder to work with because
it is so inflexible. Although Congress has allowed duplicate remedies in the civil
rights area, 209 it is evident that this remedy is not to be taken lightly. Fund ter-
mination is a severe remedy which should only be used as a last resort. Hence,
in an area already effectively protected, it does not make sense for Congress to
have intended employment discrimination to be covered under title IX.
2 ° 5 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-05 (1979).
206 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7067 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff): "Personally, I
think it would be a rare case when funds would actually be cut off. In most cases alternative
remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimination, would be the preferable and more effective
remedy." See also id. at 6544 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 7063 (remark of Sen. Pastore).
207
 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
2°8 110 CONG. REC. 7063 (1964) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
209 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974).
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Furthermore, if Congress had wanted to create a fund termination remedy
for employment discrimination, it would have done so through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), not through HEW. Under
title VII, the EEOC was established specifically for the purpose of preventing
any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practices. 2 " The
EEOC's only area of responsibility is employment. 2 " It has the authority to in-
vestigate charges, to use informal methods, such as conciliation, to bring com-
pliance, and to bring action for temporary or permanent relief. 212 In addition,
EEOC has the power to cooperate with and utilize agencies, to pay witness'
fees for depositions, to furnish technical assistance to persons, to make
technical studies, and to intervene in civil actions. 213 In short, EEOC has the
expertise and enforcement machinery available that HEW does not have. 2 "
It has also been argued that Congress wanted to have a more potent
remedy than title VII, which has been described by one court as usually involv-
ing piecemeal sanctions. 215 This description, however, does not accurately por-
tray the extent and effectiveness of title VII's coverage. Title VII is a powerful
tool for preventing employment discrimination and its piecemeal sanctions,
among other features, makes it preferable to title IX. It handles individual
problems without injury to others and when it needs to do more it provides for
class action suits. 2 " Accordingly, title IX's fund termination remedy is a
severe remedy which is not to be invoked unless all other remedies fail. Since
title VII and the Equal Pay Act provide less severe remedies which are also ef-
fective, Congress could not have intended to include employment under title
IX because employment's inclusion under title IX would then be in conflict
with Congress's declared policy concerning fund termination.
As demonstrated, the weight of the evidence examined thus far in regard
to the scope of title IX reveals that discriminatory employment practices are
not proscribed by title IX. The statutory language of title IX does not mention
employment, which is the usual practice in regulating this area. In addition,
the possibility of conflicts between title IX and other employment discrimina-
tion statutes has not been eliminated as it has been in the past between other
statutes governing this area. Title IX's legislative history also indicates that
Congress did not intend to cover employment under title IX. Further, title
VI's legislative history reveals that the language contained in title IX was not
interpreted or intended to encompass employment practices. Policy reasons
also dictate that employment is not covered by title IX. Hence, the overwhelm-
ing evidence demonstrates that title IX does not include a prohibition against
employment discrimination.
210 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-5 (1976).
211 Id.
212 42 U.S.C. $S 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(f)(2) (1976).
2 " 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4(g) (1976).
214 Compare 42 U.S.C. $S 2000e-4-2000e-5 (1976) with 20 U.S.C.	 1682 (1976).
715 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 101 S.Ct. 1345 (1981) (No. 80-986).
216 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-6(e) (1976).
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Nevertheless, an argument has been made that even if title IX does not
authorize the direct regulation of employment practices by HEW, employment
practices can be regulated under the "infection theory." The following section
will analyze this theory to determine whether it is applicable to title IX and
what the results would be if it did apply.
VI. I NFECTION THEORY
A theory that has been advanced in support of HEW's regulation of
employment practices under title IX is that title IX authorizes the regulation of
sex discrimination in employment practices when such discrimination
"infects" a program so as to constitute sex discrimination against students in
the program."' The "infection theory" would apply when discrimination in
employment necessarily causes discrimination against students.
The infection theory was first advanced under title VI. Initially, race
discrimination against students in public schools was held to violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment"' and the due process clause of
the fifth amendment."' Under the United States Constitution, it was also
determined that faculty discrimination on the basis of race had a direct impact
on student race discrimination. 22° Consequently, the rights of students in
public schools to be free from race discrimination in the form of a segregated
faculty was found to be part of their broader right to equal protection under the
constitution. 221 Title VI was enacted by Congress to extend the constraints of
the fourteenth amendment to private parties who receive federal funds. 222
Thus, the infection theory has been advanced under title VI and approved by
some circuit courts where it has been determined that eliminating student
discrimination would be impossible in the absence of eliminating faculty
discrimination. 223 This same theory may be warranted under title IX where sex
217 See Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). This theory has been accepted by one district court as applying to
title IX. Caulfield v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 486 F. Supp. 862, 885 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
" 8 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
" 9 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
22° See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 231-32
(1969) (faculty and staff desegregation "an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a
public school system wholly free from racial discrimination."); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198,
200 (1965) (students have standing to sue on theory that "racial allocation of faculty denies them
equality of educational opportunity without regard to segregation of pupils."); Bradley v. School
Bd. of City of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) ("no merit to the suggestion that the relation
between faculty allocation on an alleged racial basis and the adequacy of the desegregation plans
is entirely speculative.").
"L See note 220 supra.
"' See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 5254, 6553, 13442 (1964) (statements of Sen. Humphrey);
id. at 7057, 13333 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); id. at 7057 (statement of Sen. Pastore); id. at 2766
(remarks of Rep. Matsunaga). Accord, Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 284-87 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); id, at 327-29 (opinion of Brennan, joined by White,
Marshall and Blackmun, J.J.).
" 3 Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978) (dictum),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979); Caulfield v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 583 F.2d
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discrimination is impossible to eliminate unless faculty discrimination is
obliterated.
Even assuming, however, that the infection theory is applicable to title
IX, the HEW regulations are still invalid. The infection theory authorizes only
the regulation of employment practices that result in substantial sex
discrimination against students. HEW's regulations regulate employment
practices generally, without regard to resultant student discrimination."' If
HEW could regulate employment practices under title IX through the use of
the infection theory, it would have to promulgate regulations similar to the
regulation promulgated under title VI using the infection theory."' Since
HEW has not promulgated specific regulations limited to those employment
practices that result in student discrimination, its employment regulations are
invalid even if the infection theory could be applied to title IX.
VII. TITLE IX'S ENFORCEMENT LIMITS
Even if the evidence offered thus far is found to be insufficient to prove
that employment practices are beyond the scope of title IX, nonetheless, the
HEW employment regulations as written must fail as exceeding statutory
authority. An examination of title IX's language will reveal that authorized
regulations must be limited in scope to the specific funded programs of an insti-
tution which are found to be discriminatory. HEW's regulations, however, are
not limited, instead they regulate employment practices generally throughout
the entire institution.
Title IX's enforcement provisions reveal that if title IX did prohibit sex
discrimination in employment practices, then HEW could promulgate only
regulations prohibiting discriminatory practices in connection with specific
programs receiving federal funds. Because, however, the HEW regulations
regulate sex discrimination in employment practices generally with respect to
an entire institution, rather than a specific program, even if employment were
covered by title IX, the HEW regulations would be overbroad and, therefore,
invalid. 226
605, 611 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 883 (5th
Cir. 1966), aff'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385, cent, denied sub nom. Board of Educ. of City of Bessemer
v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
224 See 45 C.F.R. §.§ 86.51-86.61 (1979).
225 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(c)(3) (1980) provides:
Where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is not. to provide
employment, but discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin in
the employment practices of the recipient or other person subject to the regulation
tends, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, to exclude individuals from
participation in, to deny them the benefits of, or to subject them to discrimination
under any program to which this regulation applies, the foregoing provisions of
this paragraph (c) shall apply to the employment practices of the recipient or other
persons subject to the regulation, to the extent necessary to assure equality of op-
portunity to, and nondiscriminatory treatment of beneficiaries.
Id.
226 Dougherty County School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Title IX's enforcement provisions are contained in section 902. 227 This
section directs each federal department "to effectuate the provisions of section
901 of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations,
or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of
the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with
which the action is taken. )5228 Section 902 also authorizes HEW to initiate ad-
ministrative proceedings to enforce compliance if it does not obtain voluntary
compliance. 229
 The primary sanction for noncompliance is termination of
funds. A termination, however, "shall be limited in its effect to the particu-
lar program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so
found. . . ." 23° Thus, the statutory language of section 902 states that regula-
tions are to be directed at funded programs and that termination of funds is
limited to them. Moreover, section 902 speaks in terms of entities. In regard to
fund termination powers, section 902 provides that termination of funds shall
be limited and then states that this limitation is to the particular program, or part
thereof, which is discriminatory. 231
 Under this section, HEW cannot terminate
funds to an entire institution because title IX's enforcement provision would be
without meaning since the effect would not be limited as mandated and the
phrase "or part thereof' ' would be useless. This effect cannot be allowed since,
as a matter of statutory construction, a court must give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute. 232
 In this instance, it is possible to give
meaning to the words of section 902 by limiting the enforcement to discrimina-
tory programs. This analysis leads to the conclusion that HEW's regulations
exceed the authority granted by title IX since they regulate sex discrimination
in employment practices generally with respect to the entire institution.
Further support for the interpretation that section 902 requires regulations
and fund termination to be limited to specific programs is found in title IX's
legislative history. In his presentation of title IX, Senator Bayh explained that
the effect of termination of funds is limited to the particular program in which
non-compliance is found. 233
 He also noted that this language was identical to
that in title VI and was specifically taken from 11. 234
 With respect to title VI,
that language consistently was interpreted as limiting HEW's power to ter-
minate funds to a particular program of an entity, or a part of a program, that
227 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
228 Id. (emphasis added).
229 Id.
230
231
 Id. (emphasis added).
232 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882).
233
 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
"4 117 CONG. REC. 30407-08, 30156 (1971). This was said in regard to the original
amendment introduced by Senator Bayh which was ruled nongermane. This earlier amendment,
however, contained the same language as title IX in its final form. Compare S. 659, amend. 398,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 30156-57 (1971) with S. 659, amend. 874, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) and 42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1 (1976).
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was discriminatory in order to protect innocent beneficiaries of programs that
were not tainted by discriminatory practices. 2"
As demonstrated, a fair reading of title IX's statutory language, as well as
the legislative history of both title IX and title VI, reveal that the HEW regula-
tions must be "program-specific." HEW cannot assume, contrary to Con-
gress's mandate in section 902, that discrimination in one part of a school
automatically means that the entire school is discriminatory. Therefore, even if
employment practices were within the scope of title IX, the HEW regulations
would be overbroad and, as a result, invalid.
CONCLUSION
A controversy has arisen over whether or not title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded
programs of educational institutions, encompasses employment practices
within its ban. For a variety of reasons, it must be concluded that title IX does
not extend to employment. The statutory language supports the view that
employment is not covered by title IX because neither title IX's prohibition
nor its nine exemptions mention employment. This absence of any explicit
language concerning employment practices stands in sharp contrast to the
specific explications found in the other statutes regulating discriminatory
employment practices. Further, title IX's legislative history demonstrates that,
although some statements concerning title IX's coverage are unclear, on the
whole, it appears that Congress did not intend employment to be within the
scope of title IX. The legislative history also reveals that title IX was patterned
after title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contains an explicit exemp-
tion for employment. While title IX does not contain such an explicit exemp-
tion, title VI's legislative history indicates that its basic prohibitory language,
which is substantially the same as that in title IX, was not believed to include
employment.
Developments after title IX's passage also have been shown to be inap-
plicable in discerning Congress's intent in enacting title IX. Additionally,
policy reasons indicate that title IX does not encompass employment because
the primary sanction for non-compliance, fund termination, is a severe remedy
that should not be used when other effective remedies, such as those provided
in title VII and the Equal Pay Act, are available. It has also been demonstrated
that even if employment could be reached under title IX through the infection
theory, the HEW regulations are still invalid because they regulate all employ-
ment practices in an institution, rather than just those found to perpetuate stu-
"5 During title VI's passage, some Senators expressed fear that all federal assistance to
an entity would be cancelled if it were discriminatory in any federally assisted program. One of
title VI's major sponsors declared this interpretation to be inaccurate, that the termination would
only affect the particular program, or part thereof, in which a violation took place. 110 CONG.
REC. 12714-15 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). See also id. at 5253 (statements of Sen.
Humphrey); id. at 7063 (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
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dent discrimination. Finally, even if title IX were found to encompass employ-
ment, the HEW regulations as written are invalid because they apply to the en-
tire institution, rather than to the specific federally funded programs which are
found to be discriminatory. Thus, the evidence reveals that employment prac-
tices of federally funded educational programs are not within the scope of title
IX's coverage and the HEW regulations are invalid.
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